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I investigate how the extent and precision of an audit procedure influence 
auditors’ responses to errors. The results suggest that while audit procedures with 
expanded extents are beneficial, this benefit is influenced by the presence of false 
positives. Specifically, I predict and find that as the extent of an audit procedure expands, 
auditors will be more likely to recommend audit adjustments. However, this effect is 
moderated by the presence of false positives. When false positives are absent, auditors 
are more likely to recommend an adjustment when they use a large extent procedure, 
however when false positives are present, there is no difference in the likelihood of 
recommending an adjustment for small and large extent audit procedures. The effect of 
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 Audit error response is a critical component of the audit process, and auditors are 
required by standards to revise their risk assessments and planned procedures when a 
potential misstatement is uncovered (PCAOB 2010a). The current paper aims to 
investigate how auditors’ responses to errors are influenced not only by the numeric 
value of the discovered error, but also by the attributes of the audit procedure that 
discovered the error, specifically the extent and precision. The extent of an audit 
procedure refers to how broadly an account is tested and can range from testing a small 
sample to testing the entire population, while an audit procedure’s precision is defined in 
this paper as how accurately the procedure can identify true errors.1 While testing entire 
populations has not been common practice for an audit due to the high cost (PCAOB 
2017), Big Data analytics and the related technology is expected to transform the audit 
landscape by allowing auditors to test complete populations at a reasonable cost (Cao, 
Chychyla, and Stewart 2015; EY Reporting 2015; Minniti and Camehl 2018).  
Big Data analytics, defined as “the process of inspecting, cleaning, transforming, 
and modeling Big Data to discover and communicate useful information and patterns, 
                                                 
1 While not the focus of the current study, precision also diminishes if the audit procedure 
does not identify errors that are present. This decrease in precision is much more difficult 
to identify as auditors will likely only learn this after the fact, such as if an error is 
discovered in the following year which requires a restatement for the previous year. For 
the current paper, the definition of precision refers to how accurately the procedure 
discovers true errors. 
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suggest conclusions, and support decision making,” will allow auditors to analyze all of 
the data available, resulting in complete population testing (Cao, Chychyla, and Stewart 
2015, 424). Big data analytics can be used to obtain audit evidence during any stage of 
the audit, such as identifying anomalies in a substantive test of details (Minnitti and 
Camehl 2018). It is anticipated that testing the entire population, compared to a sample, 
will lead auditors to identify a greater number of errors (Krahel and Titera 2015; 
Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and Tuttle 2015), and will provide greater certainty over the true error 
amount present in the population. However, expanding the extent to the entire population 
is expected to diminish the precision of the audit procedure by increasing the 
identification of false positives (Krahel and Titera, 2015; Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and Tuttle 
2015; Yoon, Hoogduin, and Zhang, 2015). A false positive occurs when an audit 
procedure identifies an exception that later, through investigation, is determined to be a 
non-error that does not require additional follow up or any audit adjustment. In this study 
I investigate how the attributes of extent and precision influence auditors’ judgments of 
errors which ultimately affect audit quality.  
Auditors respond to the risk of material misstatement by adjusting the nature, 
timing, and extent of the audit procedures that they perform (PCAOB 2010b). The nature 
refers to which audit procedure to choose, the timing refers to when to perform the 
procedure, and the extent refers to the size and makeup of the sample. Due to cost and 
time constraints, auditors currently often choose an extent that is significantly less than 
100 percent of the population, resulting in sampling (PCAOB 2017). The use of sampling 
relies on the assumption that “items in the population are…homogeneous in the sense 
that observation of some subset of items is useful for drawing conclusions about the 
3 
 
remainder of the population” (Burgstahler and Jiambalvo 1986, 233). Audit sampling 
assumes that errors are equally distributed throughout a population which allows auditors 
to “project the misstatement result of the sample to the items from which the sample was 
selected” (PCAOB 2017, AS 2315.26).2  
Based on the theoretical assumption of equal error distribution, when a sample is 
randomly selected, the error amount projected from the results of the sample is expected 
to be equivalent to the true error amount in the entire population.3 It may be assumed then 
that auditors’ responses to errors will not differ when the extent of the procedure expands 
significantly, such as from a small sample to the entire population.4 This is in line with 
prior psychology research findings that individuals often disregard sample sizes when 
they evaluate evidence (Kahneman and Tversky 1972;Tversky and Kahneman 1971). 
However, I expect evidence obtained from testing the entire population to be treated 
differently. Testing the entire population provides auditors with evidence that is more 
reliable for two reasons. First, evidence from a larger sample provides the auditor with 
greater coverage over the population, making it less likely that an error has gone 
                                                 
2 This assumption holds for errors that are unintentional. Intentional errors are not 
expected to be randomly distributed.  
3 This is based on the theoretical assumption of equal error distribution. If errors are 
equally distributed, and a $100 error is found when testing 10% of the population, the 
projected error would be $1,000. If the entire population was tested, the assumption is 
that the error would also be $1,000, thus the two will be equal. While equal error 
distribution will not always hold in reality, auditors do not know the true error unless the 
entire population is tested, which is why they rely on error projection and the assumption 
of equal error distribution. Understanding how auditors would respond if the true error is 
later determined to be above or below the projected error is outside of the scope of the 
current research.  
4 The extent of the procedure could be expanded without testing the entire population. 
However, large extent is operationalized as testing the entire population because this 
study aims to contrast the two extreme conditions of a sample and the entire population. 
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undiscovered. Second, as a greater portion of the population is tested, less projection is 
necessary to extrapolate the discovered error to the remaining population resulting in an 
error that is more certain. Individuals have been found to be more influenced by concrete 
information (Kahneman and Tversky 1972) and auditors’ negotiation is improved when 
their argument is more defensible (Magee and Tseng 1990). By providing auditors with a 
more defensible and reliable adjustment, testing a greater portion of the population is 
expected to increase the likelihood auditors will recommend adjusting the financial 
statements.  
While expanding the extent of an audit procedure has benefits, it is also expected 
to impact the precision of the procedure by increasing auditors’ exposure to false 
positives (Krahel and Titera 2015; Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and Tuttle 2015). False alarm 
literature, stemming from Aesop’s Fable about the boy who cried wolf, suggests that 
repeated exposure to false alarms influences judgments of the warning system (Breznitz 
1984). When a false alarm occurs, the warning system loses credibility, leading 
individuals to discount both the alarm and the potential danger. This is labeled the False 
Alarm Effect (FAE).  
Returning to the audit context, the FAE suggests that auditors’ judgments will be 
influenced by false positives in a way that can reduce audit quality. When the results of 
an audit procedure present auditors with frequent false positives, I expect that auditors 
will see the evidence provided by the procedure as less reliable. If an audit procedure 
provides unreliable evidence, then auditors’ conclusions cannot rest on the results of the 
procedure. Additionally, exposure to numerous false positives is expected to cause 
auditors to discount true exceptions and fail to recognize the ‘danger’ of these exceptions 
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as they doubt the results of the procedure.5 Together, the FAE will cause auditors to 
become skeptical of the audit procedure itself, and to rely less on the results of the 
procedure. The FAE is expected to be particularly strong when the extent is large, given 
that large extent audit procedures will expose auditors to a greater number of false 
positives, and repeated false alarms increase the strength of the FAE (Breznitz 1984). 
This aligns with the dilution effect which finds that the addition of nondiagnostic 
information reduces the magnitude of response to diagnostic information (Nisbett, 
Zukier, and Lemley 1981; Zukier 1982). 
 I administered a 2x2 experiment which manipulated Extent (sample vs. entire 
population) and False Positives (present vs. absent). Auditor participants were provided 
with the results of an audit procedure that included a summary of exceptions found. 
Participants learned the results of the investigation of exceptions which revealed whether 
each exception was an error or a non-error. Participants then made judgments including 
the likelihood of recommending that the client adjust the financial statements. 
I predict and find that auditors are more likely to recommend audit adjustments 
for errors when using large extent procedures compared to small extent procedures. I find 
an interaction between Extent and False Positives, such that the effect of Extent on 
increasing the likelihood of recommending audit adjustments is weaker for procedures 
with false positives compared to procedures without false positives. Using PROCESS 
(Hayes 2017), I further find that the effect of Extent on likelihood judgments is mediated 
by auditors’ perceptions of the reliability of the procedure, in addition to being moderated 
                                                 
5 The term exception in this paper is used for an item that needs further investigation in 
order to determine if it is an error or not. The term error is used for an exception that was 
investigated and determined to be an error. 
6 
 
by the presence of false positives. Through a research question, I find that in my setting 
auditors are no more likely to recommend an audit adjustment when they use a large 
extent procedure that contains false positives compared to a small extent procedure with 
false positives. My findings suggest that false positives have the potential to diminish 
some of the benefits of large extent procedures. 
This study contributes to academic theory as prior audit literature recognizes how 
“an important (and potentially scary) byproduct of frequent false alarms is that the output 
of a[n]… analysis may lose relevance for practicing auditors if it almost never uncovers 
an actual fraudulent entry” (Cleary and Thibodeau 2005, 80). Additionally, Issa and 
Kogan (2014) discuss how vast numbers of exceptions can overwhelm auditors and 
reduce audit efficiency and effectiveness. However, prior auditing literature has tested 
neither behavioral responses to false positives nor the ability of false positives to discredit 
procedures and reduce auditors’ responsiveness to errors. The current study also 
contributes to the sampling literature (cf., Elder et al. 2013) and research on responses to 
errors projected from a sample (Burgstahler, Glover, and Jiambalvo 2000) by directly 
comparing auditors’ responses to evidence from testing a sample and evidence from 
testing the entire population, while also incorporating the related variable of precision. 
Finally, this study contributes to the continuous auditing literature (e.g., Gonzalez and 
Hoffman 2018; Vasarhelyi and Halper 1991) as false positives can play a role in the 
continuous audit setting which aims to provide greater coverage through continuous 
monitoring.  
The results are also relevant to audit practice because they identify how two 
attributes of audit procedures, extent and precision, alter auditors’ treatments of audit 
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errors. Improving auditors’ skepticism is a significant focus of audit research (cf., Hurtt et 
al. 2013), and a potential benefit of testing entire populations. In the absence of false 
positives, if auditors test the entire population and identify errors, auditors’ skepticism is 
expected to increase as they place additional weight on errors found from the complete 
population audit procedure, compared to a sample audit procedure. However, my findings 
suggest that audit firms should take into consideration how false positives can negate the 
potential benefits of expanding the extent of audit procedures before they begin investing 
in Big Data analytics to test complete populations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the background 
and hypothesis development, Section III explains the methodology, Section IV provides 





BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Extent 
 Prior research has found that individuals often disregard sample size when 
evaluating evidence and instead make decisions based on the most salient characteristic 
regardless of the sample size (Tversky and Kahneman 1971; Kahneman and Tversky 
1972). This suggests that an auditor will focus on the results of an audit procedure, such 
as the percentage of errors in the sample, when evaluating evidence and disregard the size 
of the sample used. However, sample sizes are a critical judgment made during the audit 
process in order to determine if auditors have gathered enough evidence, and the 
standards highlight the relevance of sample size to auditors’ interpretation of the results 
of audit procedures (PCAOB 2017).  
During the audit process, auditors obtain evidence to support the conclusion 
expressed in the auditor’s report (PCAOB 2010b). In order for audit evidence to support 
the conclusion, the evidence must be both appropriate and sufficient (Messier, Glover, 
and Prawitt 2019). The appropriateness of audit evidence refers to the quality of the 
evidence; if evidence is not both relevant and reliable, it cannot provide support for the 
conclusion (PCAOB 2010b). In order to determine what quantity of audit evidence is 
considered sufficient, auditors must consider the risk of material misstatement, as well as 
the quality of the evidence (PCAOB 2010b). As the risk of material misstatement 
9 
 
increases, auditors need more evidence to support their conclusion. Auditors can increase 
or decrease the amount of evidence they gather in various ways including performing 
different tests and expanding the extent of their preexisting tests. When auditors choose 
to make extent changes to change the amount of evidence, discussions about the 
sufficiency of audit evidence directly affect the sample size decision (PCAOB 2017). 
Auditors aim to select sample sizes that provide sufficient evidence in order to 
reduce sampling risk to the desired level. Sampling risk is the concern that a selected 
sample used will not be representative of the population, causing the auditor to draw an 
incorrect conclusion based on the sample (Messier, Glover, and Prawitt 2019). Sampling 
risk takes into consideration the reality that while equal error distribution is assumed on a 
theoretical level (Burgstahler and Jiambalvo 1986), it is not always true in practice. For 
example, a sample could indicate that the account is not materially misstated when it 
actually is (PCAOB 2017). Anecdotal evidence suggests auditors build concerns of 
sampling risk into their sample sizes. Increasing sample size allows auditors to reduce the 
likelihood that the auditor will fail to detect a material misstatement in the financial 
statements (i.e., detection risk).  
 Increasing the extent of an audit procedure increases the perceived quality of the 
evidence the audit procedure provides. This is due to the audit evidence from a larger 
sample being both more sufficient and more reliable to support the conclusion. Increases 
in extent make it less likely that the auditor will fail to uncover an error and more likely 
that the conclusion of the procedure is accurate. For this reason, expanding the extent is a 
tactic auditors’ use to respond to risk, such as concerns of source credibility due to a 
client having low integrity (Beaulieu 2001). Therefore, in contrast to prior psychology 
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research (Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Tversky and Kahneman 1971), I expect auditors 
to consider the sample size when interpreting audit evidence. 
Evidence Evaluation 
When individuals evaluate evidence, the characteristics of the evidence influence 
the weight placed on it, such that information that is seen as more credible is more 
impactful during the decision process (Birnbaum, Wong, and Wong 1976). Users of 
financial statement information react to differences in reliability because accounting 
information must be reliable to be considered useful (Maines and Wahlen 2006). 
Auditors are sensitive to source reliability, and find information to be more diagnostic 
when it is from a more competent and independent source, such as a specialist (Hirst 
1994). This discussion suggests that as the extent of the audit procedure affects 
perceptions of the reliability of the evidence, changes in extent will influence how 
auditors use and rely on the provided evidence.  
Additionally, when auditors expand the sample size, this provides auditors with 
an error that is more certain because as extent increases, the amount of the error that must 
be projected to the untested population decreases. Having greater certainty over the error 
influences the strength of the evidence during discussions between auditors and clients 
because there is less ability for the client to dismiss a need for an adjustment. Individuals 
have been found to be more influenced by concrete information (Kahneman and Tversky 
1972), and when there is less room for debate, auditors have greater power in negotiation 
(Magee and Tseng 1990). This is in line with prior literature’s finding that auditors are 
more likely to waive adjustments when looking at subjective issues relating to estimates 
of future events, compared to objective issues (Braun 2001) and that whenever there is 
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greater uncertainty, it is expected that auditors will come to a conclusion that is more in 
line with the client’s preference (e.g., Wright and Wright 1997).  
Large extent audit procedures provide a more definitive misstatement and more 
error certainty. An error discovered through a large extent procedure is not easily 
disputed, whereas projected errors are less defensible. Thus, auditors will be more likely 
to recommend an audit adjustment with large extent procedures. I formally predict the 
following: 
H1: When an error is discovered, auditors will be more likely to recommend an 
audit adjustment when using a large extent audit procedure compared to a small 
extent audit procedure. 
 
False Alarm Effect (FAE) 
The goal of a warning system is to allow individuals to have knowledge of 
potential danger in hopes that they will have ample time to respond to the danger 
(Breznitz 1984). Warning systems exist in different capacities, from smoke detectors to 
anti-shoplifting devices placed on clothes. While warning systems are helpful, they are 
not 100 percent accurate, which can result in false alarms. In the boy who cried wolf 
fable, the boy cried “Wolf!” again and again, but when the villagers came to his rescue, 
no wolf was there. This caused the villagers to discount the boy’s cries so that when he 
cried for help on the day when the wolf actually came, they failed to come to his rescue.  
Repeated exposure to false alarms can influence how individuals respond to 
alarms (Breznitz 1984). For example, if a siren used to alert individuals of a nuclear 
power plant incident goes off accidentally multiple times, individuals may be less likely 
to respond to the siren the next time that they hear it (Mileti and Peek 2000). False alarms 
can alter individuals’ judgments by causing individuals to discount the alarm which leads 
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them to ignore future alarms, and by causing individuals to discount the danger 
associated with the alarm (Breznitz 1984).  
Audit procedures serve as a warning system to protect the auditor. The 
identification of an exception acts as an alarm to auditors that a material misstatement 
may exist in the financial statements. Not every audit procedure identifies an error, but 
when an error is found that is inconsistent with auditors’ assumptions of risk, auditors are 
required to investigate the error and determine how it affects the audit plan (PCAOB 
2017). This investigation aims to prevent auditors from providing a clean opinion on 
financial statements which contain a material misstatement. 
In the audit context, false alarms are labeled false positives (Vasarhelyi, Kogan, 
and Tuttle 2015). These occur during the audit when auditors identify an exception that 
may be indicative of an error, but upon further investigation is determined to be correct. 
For example, during control testing, a procedure may uncover what are thought to be 
improper signoffs, but when the auditor investigates these exceptions, s/he learns that the 
manager responsible for the signoff was on vacation, and the ‘improper’ signoff was done 
by his assistant who was given signoff privileges while the manager is gone. 
Alternatively, during substantive testing, an auditor performing cutoff testing may 
identify an expense that s/he believes should have been accrued for, but is not in the 
accruals ledger. When the auditor requests additional supporting documentation for this 
exception, the auditor may learn that it is correct that the item was not accrued for 
because it pertains to the next fiscal year. In both of these false positive situations, the test 
operated as intended but the exception it identified had an explanation that indicated it 
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was not an error. When an exception is determined to be a false positive, there is no true 
reason for concern, and no further follow up or adjustments are necessary.  
False positives suggest that the audit procedure is, at times, imprecise at 
identifying errors. Based on the FAE, I expect that exposure to false positives during 
testing will lead auditors to find the audit procedure to be less reliable compared to when 
they are not exposed to false positives. This is in line with prior literature’s finding that 
auditors are skeptical of client provided support which contains small errors (Andiola et 
al. 2019). While false positives are not errors, I expect the exposure to false positives to 
reduce auditors’ trust and reliance on the procedure, similar to when individuals process 
information that contains mistakes.  
The presence of false positives and decrease in reliability of the procedure could 
lead auditors to become more skeptical, similar to when auditors face high fraud risk 
(Rose and Rose 2003) or due to auditors’ inability to ignore invalidated error information 
(Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard 1975). Applying the FAE literature, the repeated false 
positives are instead anticipated to lead auditors to discount the audit procedure itself 
(Breznitz 1984). As auditors discount the audit procedure due to its unreliability, the 
conclusions of the audit procedure are expected to have less impact on their judgments. 
The presence of many false positives may lead auditors to discount the discovered errors, 
believing that even the errors are of little concern. This is similar to when individuals 
believe that a source is biased and discount the information gathered from that source by 
weighting it less (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979), and also aligns with the dilution effect. 
The dilution effect occurs when the addition of nondiagnostic information reduces the 
magnitude of response to the diagnostic information (Nisbett, Zukier, and Lemley 1981; 
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Zukier 1982). The dilution effect has been found to be powerful both outside of the 
accounting context (Liberman and Ross 2006; Tetlock and Boettger 1989) and within the 
accounting context (Fanning, Agoglia, and Piercey 2015; Glover 1997) and suggests that 
the presence of false positives will weaken auditors’ responses to errors. Overall, as false 
positives make the audit procedure seem unreliable, auditors will reduce the weight they 
place on the evidence it provides.  
While large extent procedures are hypothesized in H1 to increase the error 
response required by auditors, false positives are predicted to decrease error response. 
This leads to the following hypothesis; 
H2: When an error is discovered, auditors will be less likely to recommend an 
audit adjustment when using an audit procedure which contains false positives 
than an audit procedure which does not contain false positives. 
 
While any exposure to false positives can affect individuals, the FAE is most 
likely and most powerful when individuals are exposed to repeated false alarms (Breznitz 
1984). Assuming that false positives are equally distributed in the same way as errors 
(Burgstahler and Jiambalvo 1986), the frequency of auditors’ exposure to false positives 
will increase when auditors increase the extent of a procedure to gain more coverage. 
Additionally, as auditors use computer assisted procedures to test the entire population, a 
failure to design a precise procedure will increase false positives (ICAEW 2016; Minniti 
and Camehl 2018; Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and Tuttle 2015). While H1 predicts that large 
extent procedures will increase the likelihood of recommending an audit adjustment, I 
expect false positives to mute this response. This is due to the large number of false 
positives in a large extent procedure reducing the perceived reliability of the procedure.  
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H3: When an error is discovered, the effect of extent on increasing the likelihood 
of recommending an audit adjustment will be weaker when false positives are 
present compared to absent.  
Research Question 
False positives are expected to mute auditors’ error response, but prior literature 
does not provide a basis on which to predict how much false positives will alter the value 
of large extent audit procedures. Regardless of the presence or absence of false positives, 
the expanded extent will provide auditors with a more concrete error, compared to an 
audit procedure that tests a smaller sample. Due to this, auditors may be more likely to 
recommend an adjustment for a large extent audit procedure compared to a small extent 
audit procedure, regardless of the presence of false positives. Comparing small extent 
procedures with false positives to large extent procedures with false positives is 
interesting as it compares the current normal protocol to the proposed future protocol. 
This will provide information regarding the potential benefit of expanding sample sizes, 
given the likelihood that false positives will consistently be present no matter the chosen 
extent. As there is no theoretical background for comparing the effects of false positives 
and extent, I propose the following research question: 
RQ: When an error is discovered, will auditors be more likely to recommend an 
audit adjustment when using large extent audit procedures with false positives 








 The study was administered to auditors working at a regional public accounting 
firm. In total, 113 participants completed the study using Qualtrics during a required firm 
training.6 Participant experience ranged from staff to manager auditors, with an average 
of two years of full time audit experience. 55.6% of participants are males and 44.4% are 
females.7  
Independent Variables 
 The experiment utilized a 2x2 between-participant experimental design that 
manipulated the Extent of the audit procedure (sample vs. entire population) and False 
Positives (present vs. absent). In the Sample conditions, the audit procedure tested 20% 
of all revenue transactions, and in the Population conditions, the audit procedure tested 
the entire population of revenue transactions.8 In the False Positives conditions, the initial 
results of the audit procedure included false positives, while in the No False Positives 
conditions, the initial results of the audit procedure did not include false positives.
                                                 
6 Two participants began the survey but did not finish, so they were not included in the 
analyses due to incomplete data.  
7 One participant chose not to provide gender information.  
8 By design, by testing 20% of the individual sales, the auditor tests 20% of the dollar 
value of revenue.  
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 In all conditions, 300 revenue transactions occurred at the company, Seven Seas, 
which designs, manufactures, and sells premium yachts. Unknown to the participants, 5% 
of sales transactions were recorded with errors. In all conditions, auditors were provided 
with information that contained the initial results of the audit procedure. The initial 
results informed participants about the number of exceptions found, but participants did 
not learn how many exceptions were errors or non-errors until later.9, 10 The content of 
the initial results provided to the participants varied depending on the randomly assigned 
condition.  
In the Sampling/No False Positives condition, 60 items were tested and three 
errors were discovered. In the Population/No False Positives condition, 300 items were 
tested and 15 errors were found. In the False Positives conditions, there was an additional 
15% false positives rate beyond the 5% error rate.11 Therefore, in the Sample/False 
Positives condition, there were nine false positives found, and in the Population/False 
Positives condition, there were 45 false positives found. These false positives were all 
later determined to be ‘non-errors’. For False Positives conditions, the total number of 
exceptions in the initial results was the sum of the errors and false positives. For No False 
                                                 
9 In practice, auditors are required to investigate all exceptions identified and for any 
exception that is determined to be a non-error, and thus a false positive, document the 
reason that it is a non-error. Therefore, it is realistic that the initial results of an audit 
procedure will include both errors and false positives.  
10 In order to avoid any negative connotations tied to the phrase ‘false positive’, the term 
non-error is used in the instrument rather than false positive. 
11 Part of the motivation of this study is the concern that expanding extent will lead to 
greater numbers of false positives than previously experienced. Pilot data revealed that 
participants anticipate a high false positive rate of approximately 50%. The false positive 
rate in the study is set slightly above this to test the effects of high false positive rates. 
With 5% errors and 15% false positives, participants in the false positive conditions learn 
that 25% of the exceptions are errors and 75% are false positives.  
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Positives conditions, the total number of exceptions in the initial results was the sum of 
only the errors.  
Task and Procedures 
 The materials used in this experiment were based in part on Burgstahler, Glover, 
and Jiambalvo (2000) and the related case (Beasley et al. 2019). The materials were pilot 
tested with audit participants, adjusted based on the findings of the pilot test, and 
reviewed by a senior audit associate. Feedback related to the instrument design and 
appropriateness of the task for the experience level of participants was also provided by a 
senior audit associate, audit manager, and senior manager.  
First, participants read background information about the company, Seven Seas. 
The materials informed participants that they were interpreting the results of a substantive 
test performed over the Revenue account, specifically a three-way match agreeing the 
customer order, shipping document, and billing document. They were told that the 
company did not have any weaknesses in internal controls. They were provided with the 
materiality level, which was set at 5% of the company’s pretax income, and tolerable 
misstatement which was set at 50% of materiality (Eilifsen and Messier 2015). To deter 
participants from interpreting different risk levels based on the extent of the procedure, 
they were told that the initial estimate, prior to testing, of the likelihood of Revenue being 
misstated was 20%, in line with Andiola et al. (2019).  
 After reading the introductory information, participants were provided with a 
document that summarized the initial results of the substantive procedure performed. In 
all conditions, participants were told how many exceptions were found, the client balance 
of those accounts, the audited balance of those accounts, and the difference between the 
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client balance and the audited balance. In the Sample conditions, the difference was 
projected to the population, and the projected error equaled the difference found in the 
Population conditions.12 The projection amounts stayed silent on sampling risk to avoid 
incorporating additional differences between conditions and due to the fact that the 
participants’ firm incorporates sampling risk into the sample size, not into the 
extrapolation of the errors. The pre-investigation difference was significantly above 
tolerable misstatement for the False Positives conditions, but only slightly above tolerable 
misstatement for the No False Positives conditions. In all conditions the pre-investigation 
difference was below overall materiality.  
Participants were then informed that each exception had been investigated to 
determine if it was an error, and were provided with an explanation of what an error and a 
non-error were prior to reviewing the results.13 For each exception, participants were 
presented with a screen that had information about the specific exception, including the 
customer name, client balance, audited balance, and difference. Then on the next screen 
the participants were told whether the exception was an error or non-error. In order to 
facilitate the speed of reviewing the exceptions, participants were told to focus on the 
results of the investigation rather than the numeric amounts, and colors were used to re-
enforce the finding (i.e., green for non-error and red for error). The number of exceptions 
reviewed corresponded with the participant’s respective condition, only the False 
                                                 
12 The Sample/False Positives projection equals the Population/False Positives amount 
and the Sample/No False Positives amount equals the Population/No False Positives 
projection. Inherent in the design, the False Positives conditions have higher initial 
exception amounts.  
13 Participants were not provided with an explanation for why the non-error occurred due 
to the fact that who was at fault, auditor or client, could interact with false positives and 
that is outside of the scope of this study. 
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Positives conditions included non-errors, and the exception order was randomized for 
each participant. After reviewing all of the exceptions, participants were provided with a 
summary screen which included the error exception amounts, non-error exception 
amounts, and non-exception amounts.14  
In the summary screen, for Sample conditions the error amount was projected to 
the population, and once projected, equaled the discovered difference in the Population 
conditions. The post-investigation difference was slightly above tolerable misstatement, 
below overall materiality, and was equal in all conditions. In the No False Positives 
conditions, the post-investigation difference was equal to the initial difference, and in the 
False Positives conditions, the post-investigation difference was lower than the initial 
difference. Please see Appendix A for excerpts from the instrument.  
Dependent Variables 
 Once participants reviewed the final summary information, they responded to the 
dependent variable questions. First, participants were asked the likelihood they would 
recommend the client to adjust the Revenue account prior to issuing the financial 
statements on a 0 – 100 slider ranging from “Very Unlikely” to “Very Likely” and how 
much of an adjustment they would recommend.15 Auditors were next asked how likely 
they believed it is that Revenue is materially misstated on a 10-point Likert scale ranging 
from “Very Unlikely” to “Very Likely.” Participants indicated the likelihood they would 
                                                 
14 Non-exception amounts are items that were tested in the audit procedure and did not 
have exceptions, and therefore were not part of the exceptions identified.  
15 In the Population condition, auditors are provided with a known error; however prior 
research has found that even when an error amount is known, there is variation in 
auditors’ adjustment amounts (Libby and Brown 2013; Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt 
2017). Therefore, this question is relevant in all conditions.  
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perform additional substantive procedures, and if so, what additional substantive 
procedures they would perform. Auditor participants then selected a response on a scale 
from 0 “Not Reliable” to 10 “Very Reliable” to the question, “How reliable do you 
believe the audit procedure results are?” as well as answered how defensible they believe 
their proposed adjustment was to the client.  
After completing all dependent variable questions, participants responded to 
manipulation check questions. The first manipulation check question asked participants 
to indicate whether the audit procedure was performed over the entire population or a 
20% sample. The second manipulation check question asked participants if there were 
non-errors included in the audit procedure results. Participants also responded to a 
true/false question asking if the procedure performed over Revenue was a three-way 
match. Following manipulation checks, participants responded to post experimental 
questions including the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale (RIT) (Rotter 1967) and 
demographic questions, including their level and the number of clients they serve each 
year.16 The materials for participants in the Population – False Positives condition were 
significantly longer than in the other conditions. To avoid Population – False Positives 
condition participants from noting the time difference, all other participants received an 
additional block of questions after they completed the demographic questions. This block 
had slider questions unrelated to the task they performed and was collected after 
everything else to avoid it interacting with any of their answers. 
                                                 
16 The RIT was chosen over the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale (Hurtt 2010) as 
Quadackers, Groot, and Wright (2014) finds that inversed RIT predicts auditors’ 







Manipulation Checks  
 Of the 113 participants, 17 participants (15%) failed the extent manipulation 
check, 11 (10%) failed the presence of false positives manipulation check, and five (4%) 
answered the true/false question regarding the type of procedure performed incorrectly. 
Of these, five participants (4%) answered two questions wrong, but no participant missed 
all three questions. Results are robust to removing participants who missed one or two 
manipulation check questions. Therefore, I did not remove these participants.  
Hypothesis Tests H1 – H3 
To test my hypotheses, I ran an ANCOVA with Extent and False Positives as the 
independent variables, Likelihood as the dependent variable, and three covariates (Inverse 
RIT, Level, and Client Number).17 Likelihood captures participants’ likelihood of 
recommending that the client adjusts the Revenue account prior to issuing the financial 
statements. RIT was inversed in line with prior research (Quadackers, Groot, and Wright 
2014), Level is based on the title of their current position, and Client Number captures 
the number of clients they serve each year. The results of the ANCOVA are tabulated in 
Table 4.1.
                                                 
17 An ANCOVA was run with multiple possible covariates, including those above, in 
order to determine if any were significant. The three above (i.e., Inverse RIT, Client 
Number, and Level) are significant, so they are maintained for the final model. No other 
covariates were found to be significant. 
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H1 predicts that auditors will be more likely to recommend an audit adjustment 
when an error is found using a large extent audit procedure compared to a small extent 
audit procedure. Panel A of Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics from the 
ANCOVA. Consistent with H1, the mean Likelihood for the Population and Sample 
conditions is 88.13 and 74.57, respectively. Panel B of Table 4.1 presents the ANCOVA 
results, which indicate that Extent has a significant effect on Likelihood (F = 9.75; p = 
0.001, one-tailed). This finding provides strong support for H1. Since an interaction is 
predicted in H3, this main effect finding should be interpreted carefully in light of the 
anticipated interaction. 
H2 predicts auditors will be less likely to recommend an audit adjustment when 
an error is discovered using an audit procedure which contains false positives compared 
to an audit procedure which does not contain false positives. As shown in Panel A of 
Table 4.1, and inconsistent with H2, the mean Likelihood for the False Positives Absent 
and False Positives Present conditions is 79.79 and 82.57, respectively. The ANCOVA 
results in Panel B of Table 4.1 indicate that False Positives does not have a significant 
effect on Likelihood (F = 0.01; p = 0.543, one-tailed), indicating that the presence of false 
positives alone does not significantly influence likelihood judgments.18 
H3 predicts that the effect of Extent on increasing Likelihood will be weaker when 
False Positives are present compared to absent. Consistent with H3, Figure 4.1 illustrates 
a significant interaction between Extent and False Positives, and this is supported by the 
ANCOVA results which indicate a significant interaction (F = 4.35; p = 0.020, one-
                                                 
18 This p-value has been adjusted to reflect the fact that the results are in the opposite 
direction from what was predicted. Calculated as 1 – (0.914/2).  
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tailed). Follow-up tests of simple effects found in Panel C of Table 4.1 show a significant 
simple effect of Extent when False Positives are absent (F = 13.66, p < .001, one-tailed) 
but not when False Positives are present (F = 0.56, p = 0.456, two-tailed). These results 
provide strong support for H3.  
In order to gain additional confidence in these findings, I ran the Kruskal-Wallis 
Test, a rank-based non-parametric test, to determine if there were differences in median 
Likelihood scores between the four conditions. Median scores were statistically different 
between groups, (χ2(3) =13.783, p = 0.003, two-tailed, untabulated), which indicates that 
at least two groups differ in their medians. Select pairwise comparisons were performed 
using Dunn's (1964) procedure. This post hoc analysis identified a statistically significant 
difference in median Likelihood scores between Population – No False Positives and 
Sample – No False Positives conditions (p < 0.001, one-tailed, untabulated). It did not 
reveal statistically significant differences between Population – False Positives and 
Sample – False Positives conditions (p = 0.109, two-tailed, untabulated).19 This provides 
further support that when false positives are absent, individuals are more likely to 
recommend an adjustment. In the presence of false positives, this difference is not 
found.20  
                                                 
19 This p-value cannot be divided by two as it pertains to the research question where no 
directional prediction was made.  
20 As a third test of H3, I used regression analysis. H3 is statistically equivalent to the 
expectation that size of the regression coefficient for Extent should be larger when False 
Positives are absent compared to present. In order to test this, I first ran two regressions, 
one with the data for False Positives absent only and one with the data for False Positives 
present only. When False Positives are absent, the coefficient for Extent is 24.860 (p < 
0.001, one-tailed, untabulated) whereas when False Positives are present, the coefficient 
for Extent is 5.569 (p = 0.392, two-tailed, untabulated). The results appear to suggest that 
Extent is a much stronger predictor of Likelihood when False Positives are absent 
compared to present. To formally test this, I ran a regression with the complete set of data 
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Pairwise comparison results can be found in Table 4.2. Comparing between cells 
for the Population condition, the Likelihood marginally decreases when false positives are 
introduced (p = 0.086, one-tailed). For the Sample condition, the difference is in the 
opposite direction as predicted with Sample – No False Positives having a greater 
Likelihood than Sample – False Positives, however this difference is not significant (p = 
0.941, one-tailed).21 The Likelihood is greater for Population – False Positives than 
Sample – No False Positives, (p = 0.021, two-tailed), which suggests that there can still 
be a benefit to testing the entire population, even when false positives are present.  
Moderated Mediation 
H1 finds that as extent increases, auditors are more likely to recommend an 
adjustment. H3 further finds that this effect is moderated by the presence or absence of 
false positives. In order to better understand why and how this occurs, I tested for 
moderated mediation using PROCESS (Hayes 2017) with participants’ responses to the 
question “How reliable do you believe the audit procedure results are?”, labeled as 
Reliability, serving as the mediator. 
Based on the theoretical development for H1 – H3, Model 8 best fits the results 
that I anticipated because it expects both Extent and False Positives to influence the 
perceived Reliability. Model 8 predicts that Extent, False Positives, and the Extent X 
                                                 
with Extent, False Positives, and Extent*False Positives as independent variables. In this 
regression, the interaction coefficient is -19.28 (p = 0.020, one-tailed, untabulated). The 
significance of this coefficient indicates that the regression coefficient for False Positives 
present is significantly different than for False Positives absent. This pattern of results 
further supports H3 and that Extent will have a greater effect on increasing Likelihood 
when False Positives are absent compared to present. All regressions included the three 
covariates for consistency.  
21 This p-value has been adjusted to reflect the fact that the results are in the opposite 
direction from what was predicted. Calculated as 1 – (.118/2).  
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False Positives interaction will each influence both Reliability and Likelihood. The 
covariates from the original ANCOVA were included for consistency. The conceptual 
diagram is depicted in Figure 4.2.  
The results for Model 8 of PROCESS, run with 5,000 bootstrapped samples, are 
found in Table 4.3.22 Panel A shows that Extent significantly influences Reliability (p < 
0.001, one-tailed), however, False Positives and Extent X False Positives do not (p = 
0.868, one-tailed and 0.165, one-tailed, respectively).23 As shown in Panel B, Reliability 
serves as a mediator as it significantly affects Likelihood judgments (p = 0.001, one-
tailed). False Positives do not significantly affect Likelihood (p = 0.672, one-tailed), 
however the interaction does (p = 0.032, one-tailed).24 As Extent significantly influences 
Likelihood (p = 0.028, one-tailed) even when Reliability is included, these results indicate 
Reliability partially mediates the relationship between Extent and Likelihood. Panel C of 
Table 4.3 shows that, in line with the interaction found in H3, the effect of Extent does 
vary depending on the level of False Positives, which combined with the mediator of 
Reliability found above, suggests moderated mediation. However, in Panel D of Table 
4.3, the confidence interval testing for moderated mediation contains 0 which indicates 
that the results do not provide evidence for the type of moderated mediation expected of 
Model 8.  
                                                 
22 In line with Chapter 8 of Hayes (2017), Extent and False Positive Presence were coded 
as -.5 and .5 rather than dummy coded as 0 and 1. This allows the results of PROCESS to 
be comparable to a 2x2 ANCOVA.  
23 The False Positives p-value has been adjusted due to the results being in the opposite 
direction as predicted. Calculated as 1 – (.264/2) 
24 The False Positives p-value has been adjusted due to the results being in the opposite 
direction as predicted. Calculated as 1 – (.656/2) 
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While the theory suggested that false positives would influence perceived 
reliability, the results above indicate that neither False Positives nor the Extent X False 
Positives interaction to influence Reliability. This pattern of results is consistent with 
Model 5 which is identical to Model 8 except removing these two relations. Testing 
Model 5 allows me to provide support for moderated mediation, but of a different type. 
The conceptual diagram is depicted in Figure 4.3. The results of testing this model with 
5,000 bootstrapped samples are presented in Table 4.4. 
 Panel A of Table 4.4 shows that, in line with the previous results, Extent 
significantly influences Reliability (p < 0.001, one-tailed). The results in Panel B of Table 
4.4 are identical to those in Model 8 such that Reliability (p = 0.001, one-tailed), Extent 
(p = 0.028, one-tailed), and Extent X False Positives (p = 0.032, one-tailed) significantly 
influence Likelihood, but False Positives do not (p = 0.672, one-tailed).25 Panel C 
provides support for the moderation as, in line with the simple effects found when testing 
H3, Extent is only significant when False Positives are absent (p = 0.005, one-tailed), but 
not when they are present (p = 0.881, two-tailed). Panel D provides support for the 
indirect effect of Extent on Likelihood through Reliability. Together, Panel C and D 
provide support for moderated mediation, in line with Hayes (2017) Model 5. 
Specifically, Reliability mediates the relationship between Extent and Likelihood, and the 
effect of Extent on Likelihood is moderated by False Positives.  
 
 
                                                 
25 The False Positives p-value has been adjusted due to the results being in the opposite 




The research question investigates whether when an error is discovered, auditors 
will be more likely to recommend an audit adjustment when using large extent audit 
procedures with false positives compared to small extent audit procedures with false 
positives. I compare the mean Likelihoods for Population – False Positives and Sample – 
False Positives, which are 85.04 and 80.11, respectively. As shown in Table 4.2, in these 
two conditions when false positives are present, the difference is not significant (p = 
0.456, two-tailed). This shows that when there are false positives, the likelihood for 
recommending an adjustment does not differ between the Population and Sample 
Conditions. In contrast, when there are no false positives, the Likelihood is greater for the 
Population condition compared to the Sample condition (p < 0.001, one-tailed). This 
provides evidence that in my setting, the benefit of testing the entire population is 
diminished when false positives are present. Figure 4.1 illustrates this relationship 
graphically.  
Supplemental Analyses 
In addition to capturing the likelihood of recommending an adjustment, 
participants indicated how likely they would be to perform additional substantive 
procedures. I ran a 2x2 ANCOVA with Additional Procedures as the dependent variable, 
Extent and False Positives as the independent variables, and the three covariates (Inverse 
RIT, Level, and Client Number). The mean Additional Procedures is 7.95 for the Sample 
Condition and 6.67 for the Population Condition. The ANCOVA reveals a significant 
effect of Extent (F = 4.71, p = 0.016, one-tailed, untabulated), such that when Extent is 
large, participants are less likely to perform additional procedures. As a common 
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additional procedure would be to select additional samples to test, this aligns with 
expectations due to the fact that large extent procedures already tested the entire 
population. While directionally the results of False Positives matched expectations, such 
that when they are present the mean is higher than when they are absent (7.45 and 7.21, 
respectively), there is no significant effect of False Positives (F = 0.02, p = 0.449, one-
tailed, untabulated). It is possible that participants in the False Positives conditions did 
not plan to perform more additional substantive procedures because they felt the 
additional procedures would also contain false positives and would not aid in providing 
the additional evidence desired. The interaction is also not significant (F = 0.005, p = 
0.943, two-tailed untabulated).  
Participants also provided a dollar value for their recommended adjustment. I ran 
a 2x2 ANCOVA with Dollar Adjustment as the dependent variable, Extent and False 
Positives as the independent variables, and the three covariates. The average Dollar 
Adjustment is $705,788 in the Sample Condition and $1,084,577 in the Population 
Condition, which is in line with expectations that the adjustment would be higher when 
the entire population is tested. The ANCOVA supports a significant effect of Extent (F = 
13.52, p < 0.001, one-tailed, untabulated). The average Dollar Adjustment is $844,942 
when false positives are absent and $937,693 when false positives are present, which is 
not in line with expectations that adjustments would be lower when false positives are 
present due to discounting the information. This pattern of results may suggest that 
participants are unable to ignore invalidated error information (Ross, Lepper, and 
Hubbard 1975), leading them to propose directionally higher adjustments. While 
directionally higher in the False Positives conditions, the effect of False Positives is not 
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significant (F = 0.42, p = 0.740, one-tailed, untabulated).26 Additionally, the interaction 
(F = 0.01, p = 0.930, two-tailed, untabulated) is not significant.27 The results indicate that 
the dollar value adjustment proposed would be higher when the entire population is 
tested, compared to a sample.  
I also ran an ANCOVA identical to above, but with participants’ judgments about 
the likelihood that the account is materially misstated, Materially Misstated, as the 
dependent variable and found that Extent is significant (F = 2.89, p = 0.046, one-tailed, 
untabulated), while False Positives (F = 0.35, p = 0.851, two-tailed, untabulated) and the 
interaction (F = 0.01, p = 0.912, two-tailed, untabulated) are not. The results indicate 
participants felt it is more likely the account is materially misstated when the entire 
population is tested, compared to a sample.  
 
  
                                                 
26 The False Positives p-value has been adjusted due to the results being in the opposite 
direction as predicted. Calculated as 1 – (.521/2) 
27 2 outliers were removed from the sample when this analysis was performed because 
their responses were more than 10 standard deviations away from the mean. Maintaining 
these participants in the sample does change the results such that Extent is no longer 
significant (F = 1.04, p = 0.155, one-tailed). These participants provided adjustment 
amounts of $6,656,125 and $18,000,000 which are 5 and over 13 times the 
discovered/projected misstatement of $1,331,225. Removing these participants from the 




Table 4.1 ANCOVA: Main Effects and Interactions 
 





































Panel B: Analysis of variance 
Source df M.S. F-statistic p-value 
Extent 1 5,789.85 9.75 0.001 
FP Presence 1 7.02 0.01 0.543 
FP*Extent 1 2,583.44 4.35 0.020 
Covariates:     
Inverse RIT 1 1,866.45 3.14 0.079 
Level 1 2,959.31 4.99 0.028 
Client Number 1 1,889.25 3.18 0.077 
Error 106 593.70   
Panel C: Simple effect of Extent given presence or absence of false positives 
Effect of Extent given: F-statistic p-Value  
False Positives Absent 13.66 <.001 
False Positives Present 0.56 0.456 
 
Table 4.1 reports the results of the measure of likelihood of recommending an audit 
adjustment. Reported p-values for directional predictions are one-tailed. This is indicated 
using boldface. Likelihood of Recommending an Audit Adjustment was captured as the 
answer to how likely they would be to recommend an audit adjustment prior to issuing 
the financial statements, captured on a scale of 0 – 100 ranging from “Very Unlikely” to 
“Very Likely”. Inverse RIT is the inverse of the sum of the RIT questions. Level is the 
participant’s current position, ranging in the sample from Intern to Manager, translated to 
a number ranging from 1-4. Client Number is approximately how many clients they serve 
each year. The means in Panel A have not been adjusted for covariates. The p-value for 
FP Presence has been adjusted to reflect the fact that the results are in the opposite 
direction from what was predicted. Calculated as 1 – (0.914/2). 
 
Extent = Extent (Sample or Population) 





Table 4.2 Pairwise Comparisons 
 
Comparison Difference a p-Value  
PNFP vs. SNFP 24.21 <.001 
PFP vs. SFP (RQ) 4.93 0.456 
PNFP vs. PFP 9.14 0.086 
SNFP vs. SFP -10.14 0.941 
PFP vs. SNFP 15.08 0.021 
PNFP vs. SFP 14.07 0.019 
a 
These differences are based on mean amounts which have covariates evaluated at the following values: Inverse RIT = 
0.0135, Level = 2.43, Client Number = 16.63. 
 
Reported p-values for directional predictions are one-tailed. This is indicated using 
boldface. The p-value for SNFP vs. SFP has been adjusted to reflect the fact that the 
results are in the opposite direction from what was predicted. Calculated as 1 – (.118/2). 
 
Extent = Extent (Sample or Population) 
FP = False Positives (Present or Absent).  
RQ = Research Question. 
 
Conditions Key: 
PNFP: Population – No False Positives 
SNFP: Sample – No False Positives 
PFP: Population – False Positives 





Table 4.3 Moderated Mediation – Model 8 
 
Panel A: Outcome Variable - Reliability 
 Coefficient t p-value 
Constant 6.24 2.90 0.005 
Extent 1.05 3.91 < 0.001 
FP -0.30 -1.12 0.868 
Extent*FP -0.52 -0.98 0.165 
Covariates:    
Inverse RIT 19.10 0.12 0.904 
Level 0.22 1.05 0.297 
Client Number 0.04 3.26 0.002 
Panel B: Outcome Variable – Likelihood 
 Coefficient t p-value 
Constant -1.43 -0.04 0.970 
Extent 9.30 1.94 0.028 
FP 2.00 0.45 0.672 
Extent*FP -16.67 -1.87 0.032 
Reliability 5.03 3.09 0.001 
Covariates:    
Inverse RIT 4,779.57 1.81 0.074 
Level -9.24 -2.62 0.010 
Client Number 0.16 0.84 0.405 
Panel C: Conditional effects of Extent given presence or absence of false positives            
Effect of Extent given: Effect p-Value  
False Positives Absent 17.64 0.005 
False Positives Present 0.97 0.881 
Panel D: Index of Moderated Mediation  
 Index BootSE BootLLCI BootULCI 
False Positives -2.61 3.02 -9.13 2.79 
 
Reported p-values for directional predictions are one-tailed. This is indicated using 
boldface. Likelihood was captured as the answer to “How likely they would be to 
recommend an audit adjustment prior to issuing the financial statements?” on a scale of 0 
– 100 ranging from “Very Unlikely” to “Very Likely.” Inverse RIT is the inverse of the 
sum of the RIT questions. Level is the participant’s current position, ranging in the 
sample from Intern to Manager, translated to a number ranging from 1-4. Client Number 
is approximately how many clients they serve each year. In Panel A, the False Positives 
p-value has been adjusted due to the results being in the opposite direction from what was 
predicted. Calculated as 1 – (.264/2). In Panel B, the False Positives p-value has been 
adjusted due to the results being in the opposite direction from what was predicted. 
Calculated as 1 – (.656/2). 
 
Extent = Extent (Sample or Population) 
FP = False Positives (Present or Absent)
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Table 4.4 Moderated Mediation – Model 5 
 
Panel A: Outcome Variable - Reliability 
 Coefficient t p-value 
Constant 6.48 3.02 0.003 
Extent 1.04 3.88 < 0.001 
Covariates:    
Inverse RIT 0.04 < .01 0.999 
Level 0.24 1.15 0.254 
Client Number 0.03 3.12 0.002 
Panel B: Outcome Variable – Likelihood 
 Coefficient t p-value 
Constant -1.43 -0.04 0.970 
Extent 9.30 1.94 0.028 
FP 2.00 0.45 0.672 
Extent*FP -16.67 -1.87 0.032 
Reliability 5.03 3.09 0.001 
Covariates:    
Inverse RIT 4,779.57 1.81 0.074 
Level -9.24 -2.62 0.010 
Client Number 0.16 0.84 0.405 
Panel C: Conditional effects of Extent given presence or absence of false positives            
Effect of Extent given: Effect p-Value  
False Positives Absent 17.64 0.005 
False Positives Present 0.97 0.881 
Panel D: Indirect Effect of Extent on Likelihood             
 Effect BootSE BootLLCI BootULCI 
Reliability 5.23 2.36 0.96 10.28 
 
Reported p-values for directional predictions are one-tailed. This is indicated using 
boldface. Reliability was captured as the answer to “How reliable do you believe the 
audit procedure results are?” on a scale from 0 – 10 ranging from “Not Reliable” to 
“Very Reliable.” Likelihood was captured as the answer to “How likely they would be to 
recommend an audit adjustment prior to issuing the financial statements?” on a scale of 0 
– 100 ranging from “Very Unlikely” to “Very Likely.” Inverse RIT is the inverse of the 
sum of the RIT questions. Level is the participant’s current position, ranging in the 
sample from Intern to Manager, translated to a number ranging from 1-4. Client Number 
is approximately how many clients they serve each year. In Panel B, The False Positives 
p-value has been adjusted due to the results being in the opposite direction from what was 
predicted. Calculated as 1 – (.656/2) 
 
Extent = Extent (Sample or Population) 






Figure 4.1: Graph of Results 
Figure 4.1 graphs the likelihood that the auditor would recommend an adjustment prior to 
issuing the financial statements. Likelihood of Recommending an Audit Adjustment was 
captured as the answer to how likely they would be to recommend an audit adjustment 
prior to issuing the financial statements, captured on a scale of 0 – 100 ranging from 






































Figure 4.2: Moderated Mediation – Model 8 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the conceptual diagram of Model 8 (Hayes 2017). Reliability was 
captured as the answer to “How reliable do you believe the audit procedure results are?” 
on a scale from 0 – 10 ranging from “Not Reliable” to “Very Reliable.” Likelihood was 
captured as the answer to “How likely they would be to recommend an audit adjustment 
prior to issuing the financial statements?” on a scale of 0 – 100 ranging from “Very 
Unlikely” to “Very Likely.” 
 
Extent = Extent (Sample or Population) 









Figure 4.3: Moderated Mediation – Model 5 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the conceptual diagram of Model 5 (Hayes 2017). Reliability was 
captured as the answer to “How reliable do you believe the audit procedure results are?” 
on a scale from 0 – 10 ranging from “Not Reliable” to “Very Reliable.” Likelihood was 
captured as the answer to “How likely they would be to recommend an audit adjustment 
prior to issuing the financial statements?” on a scale of 0 – 100 ranging from “Very 
Unlikely” to “Very Likely.” 
 
Extent = Extent (Sample or Population) 









 The results of this study aim to provide insight into how two attributes of the audit 
procedure, extent and precision, influence auditors’ judgments and decisions. By 
operationalizing precision through the presence or absence of false positives, this paper 
speaks to concerns over the use of Big Data analytics to test entire populations leading to 
large numbers of false positive exceptions (Cao, Chychyla, and Stewart 2015; Krahel and 
Titera 2015; Minniti and Camehl 2018; Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and Tuttle 2015). I find that 
Extent influences how likely it is that auditors will recommend the client to record an 
adjustment, with the likelihood being higher when extent is large compared to small. This 
is moderated by False Positives such that when false positives are absent, Extent 
influences auditors’ judgments; however, when false positives are present, auditors are no 
more likely to recommend an adjustment when extent is large compared to small. The 
effect of Extent on likelihood judgements is mediated by reliability perceptions. The 
results suggest that false positives have the potential to reduce the benefits of increasing 
the extent of audit procedures. 
Auditor error response is one of the most important parts of the audit process. If 
auditors discover errors but do not respond appropriately, they fail to satisfy their 
responsibilities. The ability to use Big Data is predicted to aid auditors in discovering 
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errors and to improve audit quality (Yoon, Hoogduin, and Zhang 2015). One of the 
greatest benefits of Big Data analytics is that it will allow auditors to test entire 
populations rather than a sample; one of the greatest risks is that due to imprecision, it 
may lead to the discovery of numerous false positives (Cao, Chychyla, and Stewart 2015; 
Minniti and Camehl 2018) which based on my findings, could hinder reliance on Big 
Data analytics audit procedures.  
My findings contribute to and extend theory. FAE literature has primarily been 
used in testing alert systems that serve to prevent catastrophic events, such as air traffic 
conflicts (Wickens et al. 2009) or nuclear disasters (O’Hara and Brown 1991). The 
current paper extends FAE into the audit setting, providing evidence that in non-life 
threatening settings, the FAE is strong enough to influence judgments. Using FAE, this 
study tests, and aims to support, the concern that was raised by Cleary and Thibodeau 
(2005) that frequent false alarms may cause audit tests to lose significance. It also 
contributes to both sampling literature and continuous auditing literature by identifying 
the role that false positives can play in hindering the benefits of extended sample sizes.  
The results of this study are relevant for practitioners and regulators so they can 
understand both the benefits and risks of expanding the extent of audit procedures to 
testing complete populations. Although false positives may not entirely negate the 
potential benefits of testing entire populations, this paper’s findings aim to provide 
auditors with an additional facet to consider before implementing Big Data analytics. 
Firms can either attempt to reduce the presence of false positives by creating sufficiently 
precise tests and setting higher thresholds for identifying errors (ICAEW 2016; Minniti 
and Camehl 2018), or they can attempt to reduce the effects of false positives. To reduce 
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the effects of false positives on auditors’ judgments, the firm could divide the audit 
procedure among two auditors. The first auditor could be assigned to run the procedure, 
investigate each exception, identify the true errors, and remove false positives from the 
results. The second auditor could then evaluate the error findings. If the second auditor is 
blind to the fact that the procedure uncovered false positives, this would eliminate the 
influence of false positives on his or her judgments. Auditors can process exceptions 
prior to investigating them through exception prioritization (Issa and Kogan 2014); 
however, auditors must investigate exceptions to identify potential misstatements 
(Minniti and Camehl 2018). False positives can exist no matter the size of the sample, so 
the results of the current paper are relevant whenever sample sizes are expanded, even if 
the entire population is not tested.  
This study is subject to limitations that provide opportunities for future research. 
This study provided participants with limited information. In practice, auditors will be 
provided with additional information about the source of the errors, why false positives 
were dismissed as non-errors, and other information that may influence their judgments 
and decisions. Additionally, in practice, auditors have to balance deadline pressures, 
pressures from the client, and firm pressures when making their decisions. The 
experimental setting is not conducive to replicating these pressures, however these 
pressures would likely reduce the likelihood that an auditor would recommend an 
adjustment. The current study is also limited by only testing certain scenarios. In the 
experiment, all conditions lead auditors to uncover errors. In practice, many procedures 
do not uncover errors, and the results of the current study may not generalize to these 
settings. Future research could test the effects of false positives when procedures do not 
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uncover any true errors. Additionally, the participants only have one source of audit 
evidence, thus the current paper cannot speak to how auditors weight and combine audit 
evidence from multiple sources, such as reperformance and inquiry. Finally, technology 
will play a large role in using Big Data, going forward. In the current study, I remained 
silent on the role of technology to equate the Sample and Population conditions. Future 
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EXCERPTS FROM INSTRUMENT 
Initial Information Screen  
Population/False Positives Condition Initial Information Screen: 
The major audit work in the Revenue area was a three-way match between the customer 
order, shipping document, and billing document. During the current fiscal year, Seven 
Seas sold 300 yachts, resulting in a population of 300 sales with a client provided (un-
audited) book value of $452,497,200. The complete population of 300 sales, 
representing 100% of the population, was selected for testing. There were exceptions 
found in 60 sales which failed the three-way match.  
 
The table below provides a summary of the 60 exceptions found. If all of the exceptions 
are true errors, the discovered misstatement would be $2,642,555. Remember the 
tolerable misstatement is $1,325,000 and overall materiality is $2,650,000. 
 Count Client Balance Audited Balance Difference 
Exceptions 60 $90,499,440 $87,856,885 $2,462,555 
 
Population/No False Positives Condition Initial Information Screen: 
 
The major audit work in the Revenue area was a three-way match between the customer 
order, shipping document, and billing document. During the current fiscal year, Seven 
Seas sold 300 yachts, resulting in a population of 300 sales with a client provided (un-
audited) book value of $452,497,200. The complete population of 300 sales, 
representing 100% of the population, was selected for testing. There were exceptions 
found in 15 sales which failed the three-way match.  
 
The table below provides a summary of the 15 exceptions found. If all of the exceptions 
are true errors, the discovered misstatement would be $1,331,225. Remember the 
tolerable misstatement is $1,325,000 and overall materiality is $2,650,000. 
  
 Count Client Balance Audited Balance Difference 
Exceptions 15 $22,624,860 $21,293,635 $1,331,225 
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Sample/False Positives Condition Initial Information Screen: 
The major audit work in the Revenue area was a three-way match between the customer 
order, shipping document, and billing document. During the current fiscal year, Seven 
Seas sold 300 yachts, resulting in a population of 300 sales with a client provided (un-
audited) book value of $452,497,200. A random sample of 60 sales, representing 20% 
of the population, was selected for testing. There were exceptions found in 12 
sales which failed the three-way match.  
  
The table below provides a summary of the 12 exceptions found. If all of the exceptions 
are true errors, the projected misstatement would be $2,642,555. Remember the tolerable 
misstatement is $1,325,000 and overall materiality is $2,650,000. 
  
 Count Client Balance Audited Balance Difference 
Exceptions 12 $18,099,888 $17,571,377 $528,511 
 
Sample/No False Positives Condition Initial Information Screen: 
 
The major audit work in the Revenue area was a three-way match between the customer 
order, shipping document, and billing document. During the current fiscal year, Seven 
Seas sold 300 yachts, resulting in a population of 300 sales with a client provided (un-
audited) book value of $452,497,200. A random sample of 60 sales, representing 20% 
of the population, was selected for testing. There were exceptions found in 
3 sales which failed the three-way match.  
 
The table below provides a summary of the 3 exceptions found. If all of the exceptions 
are true errors, the projected misstatement would be $1,331,225. Remember the tolerable 
misstatement is $1,325,000 and overall materiality is $2,650,000. 
 
 Count Client Balance Audited Balance Difference 















998 James Denver $1,230,067 $1,119,361 $110,706 
 
















335 Mark Batya $1,393,092 $1,365,230 $27,862 
 











Final Results Screen: 
Population/False Positives Final Results Screen: 
A summary of the results of the testing of Revenue is below. Exceptions labeled error 
exceptions were determined upon investigation to be true errors; the difference between 
the client balance and the audited balance for these items is shown below. Exceptions 
labeled non-error exceptions were determined upon investigation to not be errors; the 





Audited Balance Difference 
Error Exceptions 15 $22,624,860 $21,293,635 $1,331,225 
Non-Error Exceptions 45 $67,874,580 $67,874,580 - 
Non-Exception 
Sample 
240 $361,997,760 $361,997,760 - 
Total Audited 300 $452,497,200 $451,165,975 $1,331,225 
 
The discovered misstatement is $1,331,225. Remember the tolerable misstatement is 
$1,325,000 and overall materiality is $2,650,000. 
 
Population/No False Positives Final Results Screen: 
 
A summary of the results of the testing of Revenue is below. Exceptions labeled error 
exceptions were determined upon investigation to be true errors; the difference between 





Audited Balance Difference 
Error Exceptions 15 $22,624,860 $21,293,635 $1,331,225 
Non-Error Exceptions 0 $0 $0 - 
Non-Exception 
Sample 
285 $429,872,340 $429,872,340 - 
Total Audited 300 $452,497,200 $451,165,975 $1,331,225 
 
The discovered misstatement is $1,331,225. Remember the tolerable misstatement is 





Sample/False Positives Final Results Screen: 
A summary of the results of the testing of Revenue is below. Exceptions labeled error 
exceptions were determined upon investigation to be true errors; the difference between 
the client balance and the audited balance for these items is shown below. Exceptions 
labeled non-error exceptions were determined upon investigation to not be errors; the 





Audited Balance Difference 
Error Exceptions 3 $4,524,972 $4,258,727 $266,245 
Non-Error Exceptions 9 $13,574,916 $13,574,916 - 
Non-Exception 
Sample 
48 $72,399,552 $72,399,552 - 
Total Audited 60 $90,449,440 $90,233,195 $266,245 
 
The projected misstatement is $1,331,225. Remember the tolerable misstatement is 
$1,325,000 and overall materiality is $2,650,000. 
 
Sample/No False Positives Final Results Screen: 
A summary of the results of the testing of Revenue is below. Exceptions labeled error 
exceptions were determined upon investigation to be true errors; the difference between 





Audited Balance Difference 
Error Exceptions 3 $4,524,972 $4,258,727 $266,245 
Non-Error Exceptions 0 $0 $0 - 
Non-Exception 
Sample 
57 $85,974,468 $85,974,468 - 
Total Audited 60 $90,499,440 $90,233,195 $266,245 
 
 
The projected misstatement is $1,331,225. Remember the tolerable misstatement is 
$1,325,000 and overall materiality is $2,650,000. 
